Quantitative Assessment of the Risk of Release of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus via Export of Bull Semen from Israel by Meyer, A et al.
Risk Analysis, Vol. 37, No. 12, 2017 DOI: 10.1111/risa.12799
Quantitative Assessment of the Risk of Release of Foot-and-
Mouth Disease Virus via Export of Bull Semen from Israel
A. Meyer,1,∗ L. Zamir,2 A. Ben Yair Gilboa,2 B. Gelman,3 D. U. Pfeiffer,1,4 and T. Vergne1,5
Various foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus strains circulate in the Middle East, causing
frequent episodes of FMD outbreaks among Israeli livestock. Since the virus is highly resis-
tant in semen, artificial insemination with contaminated bull semen may lead to the infection
of the receiver cow. As a non-FMD-free country with vaccination, Israel is currently engaged
in trading bull semen only with countries of the same status. The purpose of this study was
to assess the risk of release of FMD virus through export of bull semen in order to estimate
the risk for FMD-free countries considering purchasing Israeli bull semen. A stochastic risk
assessment model was used to estimate this risk, defined as the annual likelihood of export-
ing at least one ejaculate of bull semen contaminated with viable FMD virus. A total of 45
scenarios were assessed to account for uncertainty and variability around specific parameter
estimates and to evaluate the effect of various mitigation measures, such as performing a pre-
export test on semen ejaculates. Under the most plausible scenario, the annual likelihood of
exporting bull semen contaminated with FMD virus had a median of 1.3 * 10−7 for an export
of 100 ejaculates per year. This corresponds to one infected ejaculate exported every 7 mil-
lion years. Under the worst-case scenario, the median of the risk rose to 7.9 * 10−5, which
is equivalent to the export of one infected ejaculate every 12,000 years. Sensitivity analysis
indicated that the most influential parameter is the probability of viral excretion in infected
bulls.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is one of the
most contagious animal diseases. It affects all cloven-
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hoofed animals such as cattle, pigs, and sheep. Al-
though the mortality rate is generally low, the mor-
bidity rate can be very high in naı¨ve populations.(1)
In acutely infected animals, FMD virus can be
found in all secretions and excretions including ex-
pired air, saliva, skin lesions, urine, feces, and se-
men. The two main transmission routes involve con-
tact between susceptible and infectious animals or
contaminated fomites such as vehicles, feed, and
humans.(2) Secondary routes of infection involve the
consumption of contaminated meat products (mainly
swill feeding in pigs), consumption of contaminated
milk by the newborn, artificial insemination with
contaminated semen, and inhalation of infectious
aerosols (airborne transmission may occur under
favorable climatic conditions over more than 100
kilometers).(3)
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Various FMD virus strains circulate in the Mid-
dle East and FMD outbreaks occur almost every year
in the area, causing large economic losses in these
countries(4) in spite of a regional FMD control pro-
gram in place involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and
the Palestinian Authority.(5) The vaccination of high-
producing cattle such as dairy herds limits the losses
due to the circulation of the virus;(6) however, it was
reported that only Israel implements a “successful
consistent vaccination policy”(3) in the Middle East.
Over the last 10 years, all outbreak strains isolated in
Israel were identified as serotype O, with the excep-
tion of a serotype A outbreak in 2009.(7)
Israel is involved in international trade of bull
semen with other non-FMD-free countries. The pro-
duction of Israeli bull semen doses for export is han-
dled by a cooperative business, whose bull stud and
insemination center is located in the Kanot Veteri-
nary District. The facility houses an average of 180
Israeli Holstein bulls selected based on their ge-
netic potential. Calves are chosen around the age of
10 days in dairy farms and raised within the coop-
erative’s facilities until they are transferred to the
bull stud and insemination center. Although no FMD
outbreaks have occurred in the bull stud since 1950,
the possibility of an outbreak in the future cannot be
excluded. The closest outbreak in the last 10 years oc-
curred in 2007 in a mixed cattle farm located 15 km
away, which suggests that the virus may circulate in
the area. High biosecurity measures are in place to
protect the bulls’ health, including confinement of
the bulls within an access-controlled stud and annual
FMD vaccination. In Israeli cattle farms, the time be-
tween the onset of the clinical signs to the suspicion
of an FMD outbreak (i.e., time before detection) is
highly variable, from 3 days for the index case of the
2006 epidemic to 13 days in 2007 (Israeli Veterinary
Services (IVS), personal communication). However,
it is expected that clinical signs of FMD would be
very rapidly detected among the breeding bulls, as
the awareness in relation to the disease risk and its
symptoms is high among the bull stud’s employees
and all animals are monitored twice daily to detect
any health abnormality. The main sources of uncer-
tainty are the possibility of virus excretion in semen
from asymptomatic partially protected bulls as well
as virus excretion before the onset of clinical
signs.(8)
Where it is present, FMD is a barrier to inter-
national trade of live animals and related products
including semen. Indeed, if introduced into an
FMD-free country, the disease could spread rapidly,
disrupting livestock production, causing embargoes
by trading partners, and therefore generating im-
portant direct and indirect economic losses for the
newly infected country.(9) The aim of this study was
to estimate the probability for a trading partner to
import bull semen contaminated with viable FMD
virus from Israel.
2. MATERIAL ANDMETHODS
2.1. Model Formulation
Based on models that have been previously
published,(10–12) a stochastic and dynamic risk assess-
ment model was developed to evaluate the annual
likelihood of exporting at least one ejaculate contain-
ing viable FMD virus from Israel, hereafter referred
to as the risk of release (R). The model was based on
the risk pathway presented in Fig. 1, which presents
the eight steps leading to the export of a contami-
nated ejaculate. The probability (P) that a single in-
fected ejaculate is exported is given by:
P = P1 ∗(P2∗ (P3∗P4 + (1 − P3)) + (1 − P2))
∗P5∗P6∗P7∗P8, (1)
where Pi is the conditional probability associated
with step i. The risk of release (R), following a mul-
tilevel binomial process, can therefore be calculated
using the following expression:
R = 1 − (1 − P)N,
where N is the number of ejaculates imported annu-
ally by the trading partner. The parameter estimates
were obtained from a review of the relevant litera-
ture as well as based on data collected from the se-
men production process at the bull stud. The inputs
and conditional probabilities are defined in the fol-
lowing sections and summarized in Table I.
2.2. FMD Outbreak Model
The risk assessment model incorporated the tem-
poral dynamics of the spread of FMD virus within
the bull stud. The evolution of an outbreak of FMD
within the bull stud was simulated using a stochas-
tic compartmental SLIR (susceptible, latent, infec-
tious, and resistant) transmission model based on the
Gillespie algorithm(13) and parameterized with data
extracted from the literature.(14,15) The latent stage
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Fig. 1. Risk pathway for the release assessment.
was defined as the period between exposure and the
time when the virus becomes detectable in samples
taken from the infected animal. This stage was fol-
lowed by an infectious stage, defined as the period
during which the virus is detectable in biological sam-
ples and when transmission can occur.(16) This dis-
tinction was preferred to the distinction between sub-
clinical and clinical stages as it has been reported that
bulls may excrete FMD virus in their semen up to
four days before the onset of clinical signs.(17) Ac-
cording to the literature, the duration of the latent
and infectious periods was set at four and six days,
respectively.(2,16,18) A study of the intraherd transmis-
sion of FMD in a 1,000-cow dairy herd reported that
the effective daily contact rate could range from 13.7
to 216.0.(15) In our model, the effective daily contact
rate was reduced to five. This is because, since the
bulls are kept in individual pens, they can have direct
contact with only two or three neighbors, although
airborne transmission of the virus as well as indirect
transmission through fomites(19) may still occur. In
a study among Saudi dairy cows vaccinated at least
once a year, the within-herd prevalence of FMD clin-
ical cases over the course of an epidemic varied be-
tween 0.3% and 53%.(20,21) Another study in vacci-
nated dairy herds estimated an average within-herd
prevalence of FMD infection of 43%.(22) This figure
was based on clinical inspection and serology, and
therefore included both clinical and subclinical in-
fections. Consequently, as all bulls in the collection
center are vaccinated annually, we accounted for the
potential lack of vaccine effectiveness by setting the
proportion of susceptible bulls in the transmission
model at 43%. The transmission model was initiated
on day 1 corresponding to the day the virus was intro-
duced into the population of 180 bulls, i.e., one ani-
mal has just been exposed and is in the latent stage.
The temporal dynamics of the estimated within-herd
prevalence f(t), which accounts for subclinically and
clinically infected animals (as these groups are both
likely to excrete virus in their semen), and the du-
ration of the outbreak tmax were extracted for each
simulation.
2.3. Evidence Gathering and Parameter Estimation
2.3.1. Is the Semen Collected during an FMD
Outbreak in the Bull Stud?
Due to the high biosecurity measures in the bull
stud and its location in a low-risk district (only one
FMD outbreak in the last 10 years), the risk of intro-
duction of FMD virus into the stud is expected to be
lower than in a randomly selected Israeli cattle farm.
Because the uncertainty around the estimate of this
variable is relatively high, three scenarios were con-
sidered for the annual probability of an FMD out-
break in the bull stud (H).
In the worst-case scenario (scenario 1), the prob-
ability that the stud experiences an outbreak of FMD
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Table I. Inputs Used for the Risk Model
Input Variable Distribution or Estimate Reference
Day of collection C Discrete Uniform (0, tmax) Not applicable
Duration between the introduction of the virus and the
detection of the outbreak (days)
D Poisson (λ = 17)
Annual probability of a foot-and-mouth disease
(FMD) outbreak in the bull stud
H Scenarios 1 and 2: Empirical distributions
(see data in supplementary material)
Data from IVS
Scenario 3: Pert(0, 0.07%, 0.5%)
Probability that the semen from infected bull presents
abnormal microscopic characteristics
M Uniform (0, 0.75) 17, 26
Number of ejaculates exported annually N Scenarios A to E: 500, 200, 100, 50, and
20, respectively
Data from IVS
Proportion of ejaculates undergoing a preexport test P Scenarios α, β, and γ : 0, 0.5, and 1,
respectively
Not applicable
Probability that a semen collection is performed in the
collection center during an outbreak of FMD
P1 P1 = H
∗ tmax
365 Not applicable
Probability that at least one bull in the stud shows
clinical signs
P2 Beta (mean 0.88, SD 0.067)
Probability that an outbreak of FMD in the bull stud is
detected
P3 Pert (0.31, 0.9, 1)
Probability that the outbreak has not been detected by
the time the semen is exported
P4 1 −
30∑
i = 0
λi
∗
exp(−λ)
i! Not applicable
Probability that the donor bull is infectious, given that
an outbreak of FMD is occurring in the collection
center
P5 f (C) Not applicable
Probability of viral excretion in bull semen P6 Beta (mean 0.083, SD 0.077) 25, 26
Probability that the semen is cleared for export on
microscopic examination
P7 1 − M∗Sm Not applicable
Probability that the preexport test performed on semen
is negative
P8 1 − p∗Sp Not applicable
Sensitivity of the detection of abnormal semen
characteristics
Sm Uniform (0.5, 1) Data from IVS
Sensitivity of the preexport test performed on semen Sp Uniform (0.9, 1) 31–33
was assumed to match the annual herd incidence in
Israel. “H” was modeled using an empirical distribu-
tion fitted to the data on incidence of FMDoutbreaks
in Israeli cattle farms available for the last 11 years
(data provided as supplementarymaterial) (IVS, per-
sonal communication). This scenario should be con-
sidered as the worst-case scenario, as it includes dairy
herds as well as beef herds. Because beef herds are
usually kept under extensive farming conditions, they
are expected to have a much higher risk of FMD out-
breaks than dairy herds through contacts with other
cloven-hoofed animals, lower vaccination coverage,
and less intensive surveillance (IVS, personal com-
munication).
In the intermediate-risk scenario (scenario 2),
“H” was modeled using an empirical distribution fit-
ted to data on annual herd incidence of FMD out-
breaks in Israeli dairy farms (supplementary mate-
rial). This is an intermediate scenario, as dairy farms
are less at risk than beef farms of contracting FMD
(zero grazing, few contacts with other cloven-hoofed
animals, high vaccination coverage, and daily surveil-
lance), but they are still more likely to become in-
fected than the semen collection center because of
lower biosecurity measures.
In the most plausible scenario (scenario 3), “H”
was modeled assuming effective biosecurity mea-
sures in the bull stud. This is the most plausible
scenario for H, as high biosecurity measures are in
place in the facilities. Therefore, introduction of the
virus through infected animals (cattle or wildlife),
contaminated vehicles, or workers is unlikely. This
scenario also takes into account the location of the
bull stud in the Kanot Veterinary District, which has
experienced only one FMD outbreak in the last 10
years (in 2007). As a consequence of this lower risk,
“H” was modeled in this scenario using a Pert dis-
tribution whose parameters (minimum, mode, and
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maximum) were set as 50% of the minimum, mode,
and maximum of the empirical distribution used in
scenario 2: 0, 0.07%, and 0.5%, respectively.
P1, the probability that a semen collection is per-
formed in the collection center during an outbreak of
FMD, was given by the following expression:
P1 = H
∗tmax
365
.
2.3.2. Would FMD Virus-Infected Bulls Show
Clinical Signs?
It has been reported that vaccinated animals
can become infected and excrete virus without pre-
senting clinical signs or presenting only mild clini-
cal signs.(20,22–25) In a study by Cottral as cited by
Callis,(25) only two out of seven vaccinated bulls
developed clinical signs after experimental infec-
tion while none of the 11 vaccinated bulls infected
via aerosols from infected pigs developed clinical
signs in another study.(26) A study of 25 vacci-
nated and infected herds in Bolivia reported that
22 herds contained at least one animal with clini-
cal signs.(22) Given these data, the probability that
at least one bull in the stud shows clinical signs
given that an outbreak occurs (P2) was modeled
as a Beta distribution with mean 0.88 and standard
deviation 0.067.
2.3.3. Would the Animal Health Surveillance Detect
an Outbreak?
We assumed that once an outbreak has been de-
tected, no semen would be collected until the cen-
ter has been cleared of FMD virus. In the bull stud,
surveillance is based only on the detection of clinical
signs (there is no routine laboratory testing of ani-
mals). All bulls’ health is closely monitored by the
staff for typical clinical signs of FMD (pyrexia, ptyal-
ism, lameness, vesicles in the mouth and/or the inter-
digital spaces).(24) A study of vaccinated dairy herds
in Bolivia estimated the sensitivity of detection of
FMD based on clinical signs at only 0.31.(22) As the
surveillance in the bull stud is more intensive than
in dairy herds, the probability P3 that an outbreak in
the collection center is detected, given that at least
one bull shows clinical signs, was modeled using a
Pert distribution of minimum= 0.31, mode= 0.9, and
maximum = 1.
2.3.4. Would the Outbreak be Detected within
30 Days?
We assumed that the bull semen is stored for,
at least, 30 days before being exported, as rec-
ommended by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health
Code.(27) Hence, we used this value as a worst-case
scenario to define the parameter P4. If the outbreak
is detected before the semen is exported, all semen
ejaculates collected during the at-risk period would
be destroyed. Published data on previous outbreaks
in Europe suggest that outbreaks in cattle farms are
generally detected between one and five days after
the onset of clinical signs.(28,29) Vaccinated animals
may express mild clinical signs, which do not imme-
diately lead to FMD suspicion among the staff. This
is likely to lengthen the duration between onset of
clinical signs and detection. The IVS expected a max-
imum duration of three days from onset of the clin-
ical signs to detection in a typical vaccinated dairy
herd (IVS, personal communication). Although the
average duration of the incubation period (infection
to first clinical signs) of FMD is often considered to
be five days, it may range from one day to up to
14 days.(28) Therefore, the duration (D) between the
introduction of the virus and the detection was mod-
eled by a Poisson distribution: with expected value
(λ) 14 + 3 = 17 days. The probability (P4) that the
outbreak could not been detected by the time the se-
men is exported, given that the surveillance system
is able to pick up the disease, can be calculated as
follows:(30)
P4 = P (D> 30 days) = 1 −
30∑
i = 0
λi
∗exp (−λ)
i!
.
2.3.5. Would the Donor Bull be Infectious?
P5 is the probability that the donor bull is infec-
tious, given that an undetected outbreak of FMD is
occurring in the collection center. Assuming that se-
men collection can occur at any time between the be-
ginning of an outbreak (day 1) and its end (tmax), the
duration of the outbreak at the time of semen collec-
tion (C) was modeled using a discrete uniform dis-
tribution between 1 and tmax. P5 corresponds to the
within-herd prevalence of infectious animals at the
day of collection C:
P5 = f (C) .
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2.3.6. Would the Collected Semen be Contaminated?
P6 is the probability that the semen collected
contains FMD virus, given that the donor bull is
infected. All donor bulls are vaccinated and FMD
vaccination is known to reduce the probability of
excretion of virus in semen by preventing general-
ization of the infection from the inoculation site.(8)
Although virus was detected in the semen of non-
vaccinated bulls following experimental infection in
several studies,(17,18) two experimental infection stud-
ies of vaccinated bulls (Grunnet, as reported by
Callis,(25) and Sellers et al.(26)) failed to recover virus
from the semen of 10 and 11 subjects, respectively.
Therefore, P6 was modeled using a Beta distribution
with mean 0.083 and standard deviation 0.077.
2.3.7. Would the Semen be Cleared on Microscopic
Examination?
M is the probability that the semen microscopic
characteristics are abnormal, given that the donor
bull is infected. Abnormal ejaculates would not be
cleared for export. A study showed that three out of
four experimentally infected bulls presented abnor-
mal semen characteristics, such as low sperm count,
low sperm viability, or high abnormality rate.(17)
However, no abnormalities were detected in the
sperm of 11 infected vaccinated bulls in a further
study by the same authors.(26) Therefore, M was
modeled by a uniform distribution of minimum = 0
and maximum = 0.75.
The quality of semen is systematically monitored
at the collection center, thus potential abnormalities
induced by FMD infection of the donor bull are very
likely to be picked up. No data were available in the
literature on the sensitivity of the detection. As the
semen ejaculates are evaluated by both an automatic
equipment and a lab worker based on viability, mor-
phology, motility, and sperm concentration parame-
ters, we assumed that the sensitivity Sm of the detec-
tion of abnormal semen (i.e., the probability to detect
an abnormality in an abnormal semen) was medium
to high. Therefore, Sm was modeled by a uniform dis-
tribution between 0.5 and 1. We also assumed that
the specificity (i.e., the probability of not detecting
an abnormality in the normal semen) was perfect.
Consequently, the probability P7 that the semen is
cleared for export on microscopic examination, given
that the donor bull is infected, was given by:
P7 = 1 − M∗Sm.
2.3.8. Would the Preexport Test Fail to Detect
FMD-Virus-Contaminated Semen?
P8 is the probability that the preexport test per-
formed on semen is negative, given that the semen
is contaminated with FMD virus. As recommended
by the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code,(27) a
preexport test can be performed on the ejacu-
lates to detect the presence of FMD virus. Reverse
transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
assays are more sensitive than the other individual
tests recommended by the OIE for the detection of
FMD virus (antigen enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay and virus isolation).(31) The sensitivity of RT-
PCR assays used for the detection of FMD virus in
blood and serum is very high.(32,33) In the absence of
published evidence on the capacity of these assays to
detect FMD virus in semen, the sensitivity of the RT-
PCR performed on semen (Sp) at the Kimron Veteri-
nary Institute was modeled using a uniform distribu-
tion (minimum = 0.9, maximum = 1).
This procedure is not currently routinely per-
formed on the ejaculates intended for export. As a
consequence, three scenarios, α, β, and γ , were con-
sidered, where none, half, and all the ejaculates, re-
spectively, are tested before export. P8 was given by:
P8 = 1 − p∗Sp,
where p is the proportion of ejaculates that are tested
and equals 0, 0.5, and 1 in scenarios α, β, and γ , re-
spectively.
The combination of these eight steps would re-
sult in the export of an ejaculate contaminated with
FMD virus. Published data suggest that dilution and
freezing techniques used to preserve ejaculates allow
the survival of FMD virus for extended periods of
time.(18,34) We assumed that all frozen ejaculates con-
taminated with FMD virus remain infectious even af-
ter one month of storage.
2.3.9. Number of Ejaculates Exported Annually (N)
The number of ejaculates imported by a given
client (N) varies between 6 and 200 per year accord-
ing to data provided by the semen export company.
To account for the variability among the different
clients and for a potential future increase in demand
for Israeli bull semen, five scenarios were consid-
ered for the number of ejaculates exported annually:
N = 500 (scenario A), N = 200 (scenario B), N =
100 (scenario C), N = 50 (scenario D), and N = 20
(scenario E).
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2.4. Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess in-
dividually the effect of the uncertainty of several pa-
rameters on the overall risk estimate. The median
risk of export R was calculated after increasing or de-
creasing the mean of the distribution of the parame-
ter of interest (P2, P3, P6, D, M, Sm, and Sp) by one
standard deviation.
2.5. Model Environment
Monte Carlo simulation uses repeated random
sampling from the input probability distributions
to generate a probability distribution of the model
output(s).(35) We estimated the distribution of the
risk of release by computing 30,000 iterations of the
model under each of the 45 scenarios. All calcula-
tions were performed using the R software version
3.1.0.(36)
3. RESULTS
The risk of release R was estimated under 45 dif-
ferent scenarios. Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 correspond to
different models for H, from the worst-case scenario
to the most plausible. Each of those three scenarios
was divided into five scenarios A–E corresponding to
the number of ejaculates exported annually (500, 200,
100, 50, and 20, respectively). Each of those six sce-
narios was further divided into three scenarios α, β,
and γ corresponding to the absence of preexport test
and to the testing of 50% and 100% of the exported
ejaculates, respectively.
For a country importing 100 ejaculates per year
and under the most favorable scenario (3γ ), where
biosecurity measures of the bull stud were taken into
account and where all ejaculates underwent a pre-
export test, the median of the annual probability of
exporting FMD-contaminated semen was 0.000013%
(Fig. 2 and Table II). Under the least favorable sce-
nario (1α), where the probability of occurrence of an
FMD outbreak in the bull stud was assumed to be the
annual incidence of FMD outbreak in Israeli cattle
farms and where no preexport test was performed,
the median value of the risk of release increased to
0.0079% for an import of 100 ejaculates.
The probability that a random exported ejacu-
late is infected being very small, the risk estimate
increases linearly with the number of ejaculates an-
nually purchased by a given client (Fig. 3). In the
most plausible scenarios (3γ ), the median of the risk
Fig. 2. Distribution of the risk of release (R) under three scenar-
ios, for 100 imported doses.
increased from 0.0000026% for N = 20 ejaculates to
0.000026% and 0.000064% for N = 200 ejaculates
and N = 500 ejaculates, respectively.
The sensitivity analysis showed that the probabil-
ity that the semen from an infected donor bull con-
tains virus (P6) had the highest impact on the risk
output. The risk increased almost threefold when this
parameter was increased by one standard deviation
(Fig. 4). The risk decreased by 30–40%when the sen-
sitivity of the preexport test on semen doses (Sp) or
the probability that an outbreak of FMD in the bull
stud is detected (P3), respectively, were increased by
one standard deviation. Modifying the other param-
eters had a small impact on the risk output.
4. DISCUSSION
Infection of cows through artificial insemina-
tion with semen collected from FMD-vaccinated
bulls has never been reported. The United States
has been safely importing bull semen from FMD-
infected countries for over 20 years. Federal regula-
tions require that all vaccinated donor bulls whose
semen shall be imported to the United States present
a negative serology test for antibodies against non-
structural proteins (NSP) (vaccination does not in-
duce the production of such antibodies) and a
negative virology test on an esophageal-pharyngeal
sample.(25) Similarly, in France, semen from vacci-
nated bulls raised in non-FMD-free areas was used to
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Table II. Estimations of the Risk of Release and of the Number of Years before Release of FMD Virus When the Number of Exported
Ejaculates is Set at 100 (Scenarios C)
Scenarios Model Estimates
Annual probability of export of at least one
contaminated ejaculate
Years until one contaminated
ejaculate is exportedAnnual probability of a
FMD outbreak in the
stud (H)
Proportion of
ejaculates tested by
RT-PCR Median 95th percentile Median 95th percentile
1 (annual incidence in all
cattle farms)
α 7.9 * 10−5 2.6 * 10−3 12,622 378
β 4.2 * 10−5 1.4 * 10−3 24,028 720
γ 2.9 * 10−6 1.3 * 10−4 347,904 7,607
2 (annual incidence in dairy
farms)
α 8.0 * 10−6 2.6 * 10−4 125,630 3,837
β 4.2 * 10−6 1.4 * 10−4 239,763 7,327
γ 2.9 * 10−7 1.3 * 10−5 3,466,212 78,456
3 (50% of annual incidence
in dairy farms)
α 3.5 * 10−6 1.0 * 10−4 282,717 10,026
β 1.9 * 10−6 5.2 * 10−5 540,293 19,090
γ 1.3 * 10−7 5.0 * 10−6 7,810,330 198,764
Fig. 3. Influence of the number of ejaculates exported annually on
the risk estimate in the most plausible scenario when all ejaculates
undergo a preexport test (3γ ).
inseminate nonvaccinated cows in FMD-free areas
between 1960 and 1991 without resulting in any FMD
outbreak.(37)
There is some debate in the literature about the
“carrier” status, i.e., persistently infected animals
able to disseminate the virus without displaying
clinical signs. There is no formal evidence of carriers
transmitting FMD virus to susceptible animals.(38,39)
Moreover, it is unlikely that a vaccinated animal
becomes a carrier, as the exposure dose needs to be
very high for this to happen. As vaccinated animals
Fig. 4. Results of the sensitivity analysis in scenarios C (N = 100
doses). For interpretation of the color legend, the reader is re-
ferred to the online version of this article.
release very low levels of virus into their environ-
ment, it is unlikely that bulls in the stud would
become carriers.(40) Although unpublished results
from Cottral (cited in Refs. 25 and 40) indicate the
case of an unvaccinated bull intermittently excreting
FMD virus in semen for up to 42 days, it is highly
unlikely that a vaccinated, persistently infected bull
would excrete virus in semen due to the protective
effect of the circulating antibodies.(38) Therefore, the
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probability of having carriers was not considered in
this analysis.
In the most plausible scenario of this study,
where a client purchased 100 ejaculates per year and
they were all tested before export (scenario 3γ ), the
median of the annual probability of exporting FMD-
contaminated semen was estimated at 1.3 * 10−7 and
there was a 95% chance that this annual probabil-
ity would be below 5.0 * 10−6. Under this scenario,
the median number of years before a contaminated
ejaculate is exported is over 7 million and there is
a 95% chance that it is over 198,000 years. Under
the worst-case scenario (1α) and for the same num-
ber of ejaculates, one infected ejaculate would be ex-
ported on average every 12,600 years and there is a
95% chance that this value is over 378 years. The re-
sults presented here suggest that the risk of release
is very low. The decision as to whether this level of
risk is negligible and acceptable is up to the importing
country. If the risk managers conclude that the risk of
release of FMD virus to the FMD-free country fol-
lowing the purchase of bull semen from Israel is not
negligible or acceptable, it will be necessary to con-
duct the exposure and consequence assessments.(41)
The final decision should be based on the results of
the complete import risk assessment. If such a trade
agreement was to be decided, it should involve an au-
dit of the facilities and processes, which would con-
firm the compliance with the different parameters
used in the present assessment, for example, regard-
ing the respect of the 30-day storage duration.
The comparison of scenarios α, β, and γ demon-
strates that the implementation of a systematic pre-
export test on the ejaculates is an effective risk mit-
igation strategy. For constant levels of parameters
H and N, the risk of release is lowered by a factor
of 2 when a preexport test is performed on half of
the ejaculates and by a factor of 28 when a preex-
port test is performed on all the ejaculates. The im-
pact of other strategies to reduce the risk of release
could be studied by incorporating them into the risk
model, as was done with the preexport test. The se-
lection of risk mitigation strategies can also be guided
by the sensitivity analysis. Measures that have an im-
pact on the influential input variables are likely to de-
crease the risk of release significantly. For instance,
the clinical surveillance system in place in the bull
stud is critical, as a higher probability that an out-
break is detected was shown to decrease the risk es-
timate significantly. Some variables such as the prob-
ability of viral excretion in infected bulls cannot be
influenced by any mitigation measure as they depend
on the immune response in the infected animals.
The disease surveillance system in place could also
be further improved by implementing routine NSP
serology tests in donor bulls to detect a potential cir-
culation of FMD virus in the bull stud at subclinical
levels. The sensitivity analysis showed that the proba-
bility of virus excretion in the semen of infected bulls,
the probability of detection of an outbreak, and the
sensitivity of the preexport test had the largest influ-
ence on the risk estimate. The first two parameters
were associated to a large uncertainty, due to the lim-
ited amount of data available in the literature. There-
fore, the risk estimates provided by our study could
be improved by incorporating the results of future
field and laboratory studies aiming at filling these in-
formation gaps.
This study suggests that the risk of release of
FMD virus from Israel via export of bull semen is
very low, even though Israel is not officially free from
FMD. Such results should be considered by decision-
makers considering importing bull semen from Is-
rael. Further, the stochastic dynamic risk assessment
model developed in this study is sufficiently flexible
to be easily adapted to other pathogens and other
settings.
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